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Introduction 
Traditional critics of consequentialism, from Bernard Williams to Michael Stocker, have 
objected to the apparent implications of (maximizing) consequentialism for moral agency. 
The consequentialist agent²an agent who has fully internalized the truth of consequentialism 
and has the attitudes and dispositions (if any) that would be appropriate given the truth of the 
theory²may not seem a plausible contender for being a morally appealing or virtuous agent. 
AcFRUGLQJ WR WKH IDPLOLDU FDULFDWXUH WKH FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW DJHQW ZRXOG EH ³FROG DQG
FDOFXODWLQJ´ KDYH ³RQH WKRXJKW WRR PDQ\´ EHIRUH DFWLQJ ZRXOG UHJDUG RWKHUV LQ DQ
objectionably instrumental fashion²DV PHUH ³UHFHSWDFOHV of value´²and be incapable of 
genuine friendship.1 Consequentialist moral theorists, for their part, have largely dismissed 
such character-based objections as irrelevant to the truth of consequentialism properly 
understood as a criterion of rightness rather than a proposed decision procedure.2 
New work in the foundations of ethics²extending the fitting attitudes analysis of value to 
yield a broader notion of normative fittingness as a (or perhaps even the) fundamental 
normative concept²provides us with the resources to clarify and renew the force of 
traditional character-based objections to consequentialism. According to these revamped 
fittingness objections, consequentialism is incompatible with plausible claims about which 
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attitudes are truly fitting. ,I D WKHRU\¶V LPSOLFDWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ WKe fittingness facts are 
implausible, then this can be taken to cast doubt on the truth of the theory.  
§1 explicates how traditional character-based objections can be understood as challenging the 
consequentialist conception of a morally fitting agent, and why such µILWWLQJQHVVREMHFWLRQs¶
are a challenge to consequentialism itself. §2 explains why I take consequentialism to have 
fittingness implications, and why standard consequentialist responses to character-based 
objections is inadequate. §3 explores Railton¶V µVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶ FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW SV\FKRORJ\, 
and argues that it, too, fails to address the problem. §4 LQWURGXFHV WKH QRWLRQ RI µZHOO-
FDOLEUDWHG¶GLVSRVitions, by investigating the question ZKHWKHULW¶VDOZD\VUDWLRQDOWRDFWRQD
GLVSRVLWLRQ WKDW LW¶V UDWLRQDO WR DFTXLUH. Finally, in §5 , GUDZ RQ WKLV FRQFHSWLRQ RI µZHOO-
FDOLEUDWHG¶GLVSRVLWLRQVWRVKRZKRZ,WKLQNWKHFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWFDQVXFFHVVIXOO\respond to 
a range of paradigmatic fittingness objections. 
1. The Fittingness Objection 
The consequentialist²and especially, the utilitarian²agent is sometimes presented, in 
caricature, as one who calculates expected utilities before each decision, who finds the needs 
of those before his eyes to be no more salient than those inaccessible and far away, and who 
is ready and willing to commit atrocities in the name of efficiency, without hesitation or 
regret.3 Such an agent seems morally perverse, far from exemplifying the kind of ideal moral 
character one would expect to find in an agent who has internalized the true moral theory and 
has the kinds of attitudes and dispositions that are morally appropriate or fitting.  
You may initially doubt that consequentialism has any implications, deleterious or otherwise, 
for fitting attitudes. Full discussion of this concern must wait until §2.1. To get clear on the 
basic idea in the meantime, the relevant concept may be grasped via the following pattern: 
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,W¶VILWWLQJWRGHVLUHWKDWZKLFKLVJRRGRUdesirable, to admire the admirable, believe what is 
(genuinely) credible, DQGVRRQ6R IRUH[DPSOH LIXWLOLWDULDQLVPKROGV WKDWZKDW¶VJRRG LV
just the welfare of sentient beings, then the fitting utilitarian agent is one who desires just the 
ZHOIDUHRIVHQWLHQWEHLQJV,IVXFKGHVLUHVDUHVKRZQWREHQRWDFWXDOO\ILWWLQJWKHQWKDW¶VMXVW
to say that utilitarianism is false: it makes mistaken claims about which things are desirable. 
Of course, ZKDW¶VGHVLUDEOHfitting to desire) may come apart from what it would be optimal 
or desirable to desireMXVWDVZKDWLW¶Vfitting to believe (based on the evidence) may differ 
from the beliefs that are optimal (given various practical incentives).4 When these two kinds 
of assessment diverge, consequentialists will insist that what matters, practically speaking, is 
the promotion of value. So it may be that we should, in such cases, try to bring it about that 
we have optimal-but-unfitting attitudes.  (Such an outcome is, after all, itself fitting to desire 
and to pursue.5 It may be that we ought to try to acquire a belief that p even if we ought not to 
believe that p. It may be rational to act so as to bring about an irrational belief or other 
aWWLWXGH³What should I believe?´ DQG³What should I bring it about that I believe?´ are very 
different questions²one answered by norms of belief, and the other by norms of action.) But 
the practical primacy of value should not be taken to imply that questions of fittingness lack 
theoretical import. AVZH¶OOVHHWKHFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWneeds to answer such questions if they 
are to offer an adequate response to character-based objections to their view. 
Fittingness objections work as follows. We begin with a sketch of an agent¶V psychology that 
seems to accurately represent a consequentialist outlook or perspective, and yet also seems 
intrinsically defective or unfitting from a moral point of view. II LW¶V WUXH ERWK WKDW i) the 
GHVFULEHG DJHQW DFFXUDWHO\ UHSUHVHQWV D ³ILWWLQJ FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW DJHQW´²an agent that has 
fully internalized the truth of consequentialism and has the attitudes and dispositions (if any) 
that would be appropriate (fitting to their objects) given the truth of the theory²and yet (ii) 
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the described agent is morally unfitting, then these premises together cast doubt on the truth 
of consequentialism. 
Why is this? Analytically, LIDQDJHQWWKDWTXDOLILHVDV³ILWWLQJ´DFFRUGLQJWRFDQGLGDWHPRUDO
theory X is actually morally unfitting, then X is not the true moral theory. If X were the true 
complete moral theory, then the X-fitting agent would ipso facto be the morally fitting agent. 
Further, if an incomplete theory X cannot be coherently supplemented in such a way as to 
\LHOGSODXVLEOHYHUGLFWVDERXWILWWLQJQHVVWKHQWKDWFDVWVGRXEWRQ;¶VFODLPWRHYHQEHpart 
of the complete moral picture. If it is shown to be incompatible with plausible verdicts about 
fittingness, that would be grounds for thinking the theory simply false. 
This is, I believe, a powerful (and underappreciated) line of argument. Just as we have 
intuitions about what the morally right action would be in various cases²intuitions which 
must be brought into reflective equilibrium with any moral theory we can ultimately accept²
so too we have intuitions about fitting attitudes and character traits, or what a virtuous person 
would look like. If we can reasonably assign some default trust to these inWXLWLRQVWKHQLW¶VD
strike against a moral theory if it violates them. And if the violation is severe enough, such 
considerations could well provide decisive grounds for rejection. 
That is how we should understand character-based objections to moral theories. Next I argue 
that the standard consequentialist dismissal of these objections is unwarranted. The form of 
the objection is one that needs to be taken seriously. 
2. Why two standard responses fail 
2.1 Must consequentialism have fittingness implications? 
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One might question ZKHWKHUWKHUH¶VDQ\VXFKWKLQJDV³WKHILWWLQJFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWDJHQW´. I 
sometimes introduce ILWWLQJQHVVWDONLQWHUPVRIZKDW¶s rationally warranted IURPWKH³SRLQW
RIYLHZ´RIDPRUDOWKHRU\EXW\RXPLJKWZHOOZRQGHUZKether moral theories are really the 
sorts of things that can have perspectives. ,IWKH\¶UHQRWRULIFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVPLQSDUWLFXODU
QHHGQ¶W KDYH DQ\ LPSOLFDWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ ILWWLQJQHVV WKHQ DUHQ¶W fittingness objections to 
consequentialism unable to get off the ground? 
I have two broad replies to this line of concern. My first (and more ambitious) response is to 
try to convince you that these ideas do all make sense. But I also have a more conciliatory 
backup option in case this fails. 
:KDWLVWKH³SHUVSHFWLYH´RIDPRUDOWKHRU\" ,W¶VMXVW an abstraction from the perspective of a 
rational agent who has fully internalized the theory, and whose psychology thus reflects, in 
isomorphism, the dictums of the theory²being attuned to just the considerations that the 
theory identifies as morally significant. I find it plausible that any normative claim has some 
corresponding specification in the psychology of the fitting agent.6 It may even be (though I 
GRQ¶WQHHGWKLVDQGZRQ¶WDUJXHIRULWKHUHWKDWWKHVHLPSOLFations for the fitting psychology 
are what ultimately give content to our various normative concepts and the claims that we 
make with them. For example, given the conceptual link between goodness and desirability, 
to claim that the happiness of sentient beings is good straightforwardly implies that it is 
fitting to desire that sentient beings be happy. Anyone who failed to have such a desire would 
clearly not count as having properly internalized the thesis that happiness is good. More 
controversially: it may be that the appropriateness of desiring the general happiness is what 
gives conteQWWRWKHFODLPWKDWLW¶s good. This link to fitting agential responses is what makes 
the normative claim significant to us as agents: it has implications for how we should be. 
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Insofar as any particular consequentialist view presupposes a theory of the good, it has 
implications for the fittingness of the corresponding desires, at least. But if other sorts of 
normative claims are practically significant at all, they too must presumably have some sort 
of agential (fittingness) implications. Presumably right actions, for example, are those that 
LW¶V fitting for us to choose (or to intend). If a theory marks certain kinds of acts²lying, 
say²as inherently and absolutely wrong, this might be reflected in a fitting psychology by 
refusing to even entertain such acts as options.7 Any genuine moral considerations should 
presumably find some traction in the psychology of the fitting agent, whereas bad reasons (or 
non-UHDVRQVVKRXOGQ¶W 
,I,¶PULJKWDERXWDOOWKDWWKHQDQ\PRUDOWKHRU\ZLOO ultimately have fittingness implications, 
HYHQLIWKH\DUHQ¶WH[SOLFLWLQFDQRQLFDOVWDWHPHQWVRIWKHWKHRU\ So long as we can identify 
which attitudes and habits of thought inevitably follow from the proper internalization of a 
PRUDOYLHZWKHQZHKDYHDJUDVSRQZKDWWKH³ILWWLQJDJHQW´DFFRUGLQJWRWKDWWKHRU\ORRNV
like. And we can then assess whether this agent plausibly is morally fitting. 
%XW VXSSRVH ,¶P ZURQJ DERXW all that. 6XSSRVH ZH FDQ¶W VWULFWO\ VSHDNLQJ LQIHU DQ\
fittingness claims (besides perhaps the value ± desirability link) from the core tenets of a 
moral theory. And suppose one were to endorse a conceptually ³sparse´ form of 
consequentialism which made no explicit claims about value, either, but just directly 
specified that agents morally ought to maximize happiness (or whatever). Would such a 
sparse view still be subject to fittingness objections? 
I think it would. This is because we could still raise questions about whether these basic 
deontic claims are compatible with plausible claims about fittingness. Even if the theory has 
no positive fittingness implications, it surely has negative implications, as there are 
constraints on what fittingness claims can coherently be combined with various deontic 
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claims. For example, the deontic claim that we ought always to maximize happiness is clearly 
in tension with claims WKDWLW¶VILWWLQJWRYDOXHRUGHVLUHWKLQJVRWKHUWKDQKDSSLQHVV or that a 
fitting agent would never even think of lyingRUWKDWLW¶VILWWLQJWRSUHIHUWRVDYH\RXUFKLOG¶V
life over that of two strangers. 
So there remains a real challenge here. Even the most conceptually sparse consequentialist 
must either argue that such fittingness claims are incorrect²that they misdescribe what 
attitudes and patterns of thought are truly warranted or fitting²or else argue that their sparse 
consequentialism can be supplemented or developed in such a way as to coherently combine 
plausible fittingness claims with their original deontic claim. (Which of these two is the most 
promising strategy in any given case will, of course, depend on the details. For example, I 
GRQ¶W WKLQN LW¶V WUXH WKDW O\LQJ VKRXOG DOZD\VEHXQWKLQNDEOH But it seems right to me that 
certaiQNLQGVRIDFWLRQVVKRXOGQRWJHQHUDOO\EH³RQRXUUDGDU´DQGVR,JRRQ²later in the 
paper²to show how consequentialists might accommodate this.) 
)RUHDVHRIH[SRVLWLRQ,ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRVSHDNRIWKH³ILWWLQJFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWDJHQW´ But if 
you are not convinced that consequentialism has positive fittingness implications, feel free to 
UHDGWKLVDVVKRUWKDQGIRU³WKHPRVWSODXVLEOHVXSSOHPHQWDU\YLHZRIWKHµILWWLQJDJHQW¶WKDWLV
FRPSDWLEOHZLWKFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVP´ 
2.2 Criteria of rightness vs. decision procedures 
In response to character-based objections, consequentialists standardly distinguish between 
criteria of rightness and decision procedures.8 Just because utilitarians hold that an act is 
right when LWPD[LPL]HVH[SHFWHGXWLOLW\VD\LWGRHVQ¶Wfollow that they recommend actually 
trying to calculate utilities in your everyday life. Indeed, given that such constant calculation 
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would be predictably counterproductive (due to lack of time, misleading evidence, cognitive 
bias, setting bad precedents, etc.), utilitarians would strongly recommend against it!9  
All this is true enough, but beside the point. I agree that iW¶V DQ RSHQ HPSLULFDO TXHVWLRQ
whether being morally fitting (whatever that turns out to involve) would bring about good 
results in our DFWXDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV MXVW DV LW¶V DQ RSHQ HPSLULFDO TXHVWLRQ ZKHWKHU EHLQJ
rational more generally has positive instrumental value). ,I LW ZRXOGQ¶W KDYH JRRG UHVXOWV
then consequentialism may recommend against its own internalization²the possibility of 
sXFK³VHOI-HIIDFLQJQHVV´ LVDIDPLOLDUDQGXQSUREOHPDWLFIHDWXUHRIWKHYLHZ 1RWKLQJ,¶YH
VDLGGHQLHVDQ\RIWKLV,KDYHQ¶WFODLPHGWKDWZHQHFHVVDULO\RXJKWWRWU\WREHFRPHILWWLQJ
agents, come what may. Any consequentialist should agree that there are more important 
things than the quality of our characters, after all. 
7KH REMHFWLRQ LV QRW WR FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVP¶V recommendations, but to its implications. The 
standard consequentialist response assumes that the only way that consequentialists can 
assess decision procedures (and psychological elements more generally) is in terms of their 
LQVWUXPHQWDO YDOXH RU ZKHWKHU WKH\¶UH ZRUWK LQFXOFDWLQJ In the previous section, I argued 
that this is not so. 7KHUH¶Valso DIDFWRI WKHPDWWHUDV WRZKDW WKHµILWWLQJ¶consequentialist 
psychology would be, quite independently of what psychology consequentialism recommends 
(on grounds of utility) that we try to inculcate. But if the fitting consequentialist psychology 
can be shown to be not actually morally fitting, that would²as previously explained²pose a 
serious problem for the view.  
6RZHFDQ¶W MXVW LJQRUHGHFLVLRQ-procedures and other psychological elements. And nor can 
we merely settle for identifying those which best promote value, and are thus recommended 
by consequentialism. As normative theorists, interested in whether or not consequentialism is 
a true moral theory, we must also investigate what kind of psychology would be a fitting 
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psychology to possess, were consequentialism true. We can then assess whether this fitting 
consequentialist psychology is plausibly morally fitting, and hence whether consequentialism 
itself remains an eligible moral theory.  
In the following sections, I explore two very different strategies for constructing a non-
defective consequentialist psychology in answer to this challenge. First I consider the 
5DLOWRQLDQ³VRSKLVWLFDWHG´SV\FKRORJ\ZLWKQRQ-consequentialist desires. Then I explain and 
defend my preferred account, according to which critics are mistaken to assume that an agent 
with fitting utilitarian motivations would thereby conform to their caricature.  
3. Sophisticated Consequentialism 
3.1 Explication 
Railton contrasts two kinds of hedonistic (or, more broadly, consequentialist) psychologies, 
which we may consider as candidate views of ZKDW¶VILWWLQJµVXEMHFWLYH¶DQGµVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶ 
psychologies.10 The subjective hedonist is solely motivated by concern for his own happiness. 
+RZHYHU WKH µSDUDGR[ RI KHGRQLVP¶ VXJJHVWV WKDW VXFK D SHUVRQ LV OLkely to end up quite 
unhappy. Happiness may be better achieved by those who are motivated by other concerns. 
Railton thus introduces the sophisticated hedonist²OHW¶V FDOO KHU µ6RSKLH¶²ZKR ³DLPV WR
lead an objectively hedonistic life (that is, the happiest life available to [her] in the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQG\HWLVQRWFRPPLWWHGWRVXEMHFWLYHKHGRQLVP´11 Sophie may thus possess 
and act on distinctively non-hedonistic motives²e.g., concern for others²if such desires are 
conducive to her living a happier life overall. 
Once she has moved beyond subjective hedonism, and acquired a happy collection of non-
KHGRQLVWLFPRWLYDWLRQVZHPD\EHJLQWRZRQGHULQZKDWVHQVH6RSKLHLVVWLOOD³KHGRQLVW´DW
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all, rather than a whole-hearted pluralist. What sets Sophie apart, according to Railton, is that 
her psychology continues to be regulated by a counterfactual condition according to which, 
GHVSLWHKHUYDULRXVGHVLUHVVKH³ZRXOGQRWDFWDV >V@KHGRHV LI LWZHUHQRWFRPSDWLEOHZLWK
[her] leading an objectively hedonistic life.´12  
Whereas the subjective hedonist regulates her individual actions according to hedonistic 
QRUPV6RSKLH¶VKHGRQLVPLQVWHDGUHJXODWHVKHUGHVLUHVDQGGLVSRVLWLRQV6RIRUH[DPSOHKHU
pro-friendship disposition may lead Sophie to perform individual acts that reduce her 
happiness²e.g. DQVZHULQJKHU IULHQG¶VGLVWUDXJKW DP call²EXWKHU µKHGRQLFPRQLWRU¶ LV
not triggered to intervene unless it becomes clear that the relationship as a whole is 
detrimental to her happiness, such that she would be better off in the long run with different 
desires and dispositions.  
One may question how this regulative mechanism is supposed to work. In particular, we may 
wonder whether Sophie has an overriding desire to possess hedonically fortunate 
dispositions, that she will act upon (overriding her other, non-hedonistic desires) whenever 
VKH¶VLQDSRVLWLRQWRGRVRBut such an agent may be better described as a simple maximizer 
of happiness-promoting dispositions, rather than a sophisticated maximizer of happiness! 
6RSKLH¶V KHGRQLVP is better understood as manifested not in a desire at all, but rather a 
higher-order mechanism that serves to regulate her desires through some sub-personal causal 
process. The key difference is that this hedonistic mechanism, unlike a desire, never directly 
manifests itself in action. It is not itself a motivation that she may act on (though it may cause 
her to acquire some independently motivating hedonistic desires, insofar as these would 
cause her to live a happier life). Its control over her actions is instead wholly indirect: The 
KHGRQLFPRQLWRUVKDSHV6RSKLH¶VGHVLUHVLQKHGRQLFDOO\IRUWXQDWHZD\VDQGWKHQVKHDFWVRQ
those desires, whatever they may be. 
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7KHµVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶SV\FKRORJ\may thus be described in two parts: FirsWWKHUHLVWKHDJHQW¶V
RYHUDUFKLQJ ³SULPDU\ JRDO´ ZKLFK VKH PD\ LGHQWLI\ ZLWK GXULQJ UHIOHFWLYH PRPHQWV EXW
which does not tend to directly motivate her actions. Instead, she is moved by the 
³VHFRQGDU\´GHVLUHVDQGGLVSRVLWLRQVWKDWDUHSURGXFHGDQGUHJulated by a mechanism that is 
responsive to her primary goal.  
3.2 Evaluation 
Supposing that the psychology described in §3.1 LVFRKHUHQWLW¶VDQLQWHUHVWLQJTXHVWLRQKRZ
exactly we should evaluate it. Is it a plausible account of the fitting consequentialist 
psychology? According to HJRVWLFKHGRQLVPRQH¶VRZQSOHDVXUHLVWKHRQO\HQGWKDW¶VWUXO\
desirable, or worth pursuing. Sophie then seems irrational, by hedonistic lights, in that her 
desires are not necessarily directed at what is (according to this theory) desirable, and her 
actions likewise fail to be sensitive to hedonistic reasons: she often benefits others at her own 
expense. On the other hand, she is not completely insensitive to hedonistic reasons: Her 
desire-regulating faculty ensures that she maintains the desires that (the evidence suggests) it 
is hedonically best for her to have²and if circumstances change, so will her dispositions. 
7KLV VXJJHVWV DQ LPSRUWDQW VHQVH LQ ZKLFK 6RSKLH¶V UHIOHFWLYH KHGRQLVP LV XOWLPDWHO\ µLQ
FRQWURO¶HYHQLIit is not what moves her. We may thus need to draw a distinction between 
(local) act and (global) agent rationality, allowing us to say that Sophie is rationally fitting or 
responsive to reasons, even if her particular actions are not.  
,W¶VZRUWKQRWLQJWhat even this vestige of rational sensitivity may, in special circumstances, 
make her worse off. Consider Parfit¶V H[DPSOH RI WKH VRFLHW\ RI SHUIHFWO\ UDWLRQDO HJRLVWV
some of whom come to realize that it will advance their interests to become irrational in a 
specific respect: namely, if they become transparently disposed to follow through on their 
threats regardless of the costs to themselves.13 6XFKD³WKUHDW-IXOILOOHU´FDQWKHQVWUDSDERPE
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to his chest, and threaten an egoist that he will detonate it (killing them both) unless the egoist 
complies with his whims. He can safely make such threats, because he knows the egoist 
would sooner comply than die. As Parfit further shows, the rational response for the 
remaining egoists is to turn themselves into tranVSDUHQW ³WKUHDW LJQRUHUV´ ZKR DUH VWDEO\
disposed to (irrationally) ignore threats no matter the costs to themselves. A threat-fulfiller 
will leave the ignorers alone, because he knows that if he were to threaten them, they would 
ignore him, and he would then detonate the bomb, killing them both. (Note that the threat-
fulfiller will not issue threats that he expects will make him worse off. It is merely fulfilling 
threats that he does blindly.)  
In comparison to the pure threat-ignorers, Sophie is more apt to have her instrumental 
rationality exploited. Given transparency, the threat-fulfiller will know that if he threatens 
6RSKLHVKHZLOOFRPSO\)RU6RSKLH¶VUHJXODWLQJPHFKDQLVPVZLOOQRWDOORZKHUWRPDLQWDLQD
disposition once it becomes clear that it is disastrous for her long-term happiness. And a 
threat-ignoring disposition becomes clearly disastrous as soon one is actually issued with a 
credible apocalyptic threat. So, a threat-fulfiller will know that he can safely threaten Sophie, 
and she will (if necessary change her dispositions and) comply rather than die. To avoid such 
exploitation, Sophie would have to alter her psychology so that she would become a pure 
(unregulated, insensitive) threat-ignorer²at which point she would no longer be a 
sophisticated hedonist. She would just be (however fortunately) irrational, by hedonistic 
lights.  
We thus find that a Railtonian sophisticated psychology is by no means guaranteed to endorse 
itself as the most fortunate psychology to possess in every possible situation. But it offers a 
suggestive alternative to the standard conception of an instrumentally rational psychology. 
Insofar as we are drawn to the idea that rationality should not normally be a curse (even if it 
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may be in certain special circumstances), we PD\VHH6RSKLH¶VWZR-level psychology²with 
its capacity for her primary goal to control and regulate her secondary, action-guiding 
motivations²DV DQ LPSURYHPHQW RYHU WKH VXEMHFWLYH KHGRQLVW¶V XQLWDU\ PRWLYDWLRQDO
structure. While acknowledging that Sophie¶V DFWLRQV DUH RIWHQ ORFDOO\ LUUDWLRQDO E\
hedonistic lights), we may be more concerned to evaluate her global rationality as an agent. 
In this respect, at least, she may at first glance seem more reasonable.  
I think there are important grounds for doubtLQJ WKLVFRQFOXVLRQKRZHYHU/HW¶V UHWXUQRXU
attention from hedonism to utilitarianism. The sophisticated utilitarian²FDOOKHU µ6RSKX¶²
will have whatever motivations are most conducive to promoting the general welfare. So, in 
particular, if an evil demon threatens to torture an innocent population unless Sophu comes to 
intrinsically want them to suffer,14 then Sophu will be led to acquire this fortunate but 
malicious motivation.15 This is a good outcome, in the circumstances, as it prevents a lot of 
suffering. But if any desire is unfitting by utilitarian lights (or common intuition, for that 
matter), it is surely an intrinsic desire that others suffer. Sophu has, quite virtuously, made 
herself vicious. And note that it is not just her actions, but her desires²her very self, we 
might think²that is impugned here. She (non-instrumentally) desires what is blatantly 
undesirable, thus violating the most basic criteria for qualifying as a fitting agent. Yet she is 
VWLOO D VRSKLVWLFDWHG XWLOLWDULDQ 6R WKLV µVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶ FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW SV\FKRORJ\ LV QRW
adequate as an account of the fitting consequentialist psychology. 
The advocate of sophisticated utilitarianism might at this point defend Sophu¶V XWLOLWDULDQ
credentials by pointing out that her deepest commitments remain pure and altruistic, even as 
they respond to the unfortunate circumstances by shaping her motivations in this malicious-
but-instrumentally-valuable direction. So there at least remains something fitting about 
6RSKX¶V SV\FKRORJ\ But it nonetheless contains potential moral defects of a sort that cast 
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doubt on claims that she qualifies as a fitting utilitarian agent overall. So it is worth 
investigating whether we can do better with a more direct approach.  
4. Rational Transmission and Well-Calibrated Dispositions 
:H FDQ LGHQWLI\ ZKHUH WKH µVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶ SV\FKRORJ\ JRHV ZURQJ (or fails to accurately 
represent a fitting consequentialist perspective), by considering the relation between (i) the 
rationality of acquiring and maintaining a desire or disposition, and (ii) the rationality of 
µDFWLQJ RQ¶ WKH GLVSRVLWLRQ LH performing an action that the disposition characteristically 
disposes you towards. Consider the following simple principle of rational transmission: 
(RT-past) For any disposition D and act A that is characteristic of D: If it was 
rational to acquire D then it is rational to perform A. 
Parfit¶VDERYH-described case of the threat-fulfillers casts doubt on this principle. It may well 
be rational for a self-interested agent to acquire the threat-fulfilling disposition, but if 
WKURXJK VRPH LUUDWLRQDO TXLUN D WKUHDWHQHG WDUJHW XQH[SHFWHGO\ LJQRUHV WKH DJHQW¶V
apocalyptic threat, it is surely not rational for the agent to follow through and blow 
themselves up. Such disastrous stubbornness would seem, on the contrary, quite crazy.  
Gauthier is not wholly convinced by this counterexample to RT-past, but suggests and 
endorses a weaker transmission principle, which we may formulate as follows for any 
disposition D and act A that is characteristic of D:16  
(RT-present) If it was rational to acquire D and is rational to maintain it presently, 
then it is rational to perform A. 
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This principle, if true, could potentially vindicate the rationality of the sophisticated 
FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW¶V Dctions (and hence, arguably, the fittingness of their motivating desires). 
However, Parfit points out that even this weakened transmission principle is susceptible to 
counterexamples, such as:  
6FKHOOLQJ¶V&DVHA robber threatens that, unless I unlock my safe and give him all my money, he will 
VWDUWWRNLOOP\FKLOGUHQ,WZRXOGEHLUUDWLRQDOIRUPHWRLJQRUHWKLVUREEHU¶VWKUHDW%XWHYHQLI,JDYH
in to his threat, there is a risk that he will kill us all, to reduce his chance of being caught. [... I]t would 
be rational for me to take a drug that would make me [transparently] very irrational. The robber would 
then see that it was pointless to threaten me; and since he could not commit his crime, and I would not 
be capable of calling the police, he would also be less likely to kill either me or my children. [...] But 
while I am in my drug-induced state, and before the robber leaves, I act in damaging and self-defeating 
ways. I beat my children because I love them. I burn my manuscripts because I want to preserve 
them.17 
Parfit stipulates that these destructive acts are not necessary to convince the robber that you 
are irrational. So they have no good effects, though they stem from a disposition (namely, the 
disposition to act irrationally) that it is worthwhile, for extrinsic reasons, to acquire and 
maintain$UHWKHVHDFWVUDWLRQDO",VKDUH3DUILW¶VVHQVHWKDWWKH\DUHQRW6RWKHWUDQVPLVVLRQ
principles considered thus far fail, suggesting a robust disconnect between the rationality of 
acquiring and maintaining a disposition vs. the rationality of acting upon it.  
7KHIXQGDPHQWDOH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKLVGLVFRQQHFWLVWKDWDQDJHQW¶VGLVSRVLWLRQVFDQKDYHRWKHU
consequences besides producing downstream acts in the agent herself. In particular, you 
might be harmed or rewarded directly on the basis of whether you possess some disposition, 
independently of whether you act on it. This suggests that we can distinguish (i) dispositions 
that have high expected value, all things considered, and (ii) dispositions that have high 
expected value LQUHVSHFWRIWKHGRZQVWUHDPDFWLRQVWKH\¶OOWHQGWRSURGXFH. We can call the 
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IRUPHUFODVVRIGLVSRVLWLRQVµGHVLUDEOH¶DQGWKHODWWHUµZHOO-FDOLEUDWHG¶'LVSRVLWLRQVWKDWDUH
desirable but not well-FDOLEUDWHGZHPD\FDOOµH[WULQVLFDOO\GHVLUDEOH¶,WLVWKHVHH[WULQVLFDOO\
GHVLUDEOHGLVSRVLWLRQVWKDWIHDWXUHLQ3DUILW¶VFDVHVRIµUDWLRQDOLUUDWLRQDOLW\¶LHZKHUHE\LWLV
rational to acquire and maintain such a disposition, but irrational to act upon it.18  
While acknowledging this possibility, we may still think that there must be some transmission 
principles according to which the rational status of a general rule or disposition can be 
inherited by the particular acts it prescribes. And, indHHGWKHGLVWLQFWLRQ,¶YHMXVWKLJKOLJKWHG
suggests an obvious candidate principle: we just need to restrict the dispositions in question 
WR WKRVH WKDW DUH µZHOO-FDOLEUDWHG¶ LH desirable for their (expected) impact on your 
downstream actions, rather than for other reasons. Consider the following transmission 
principle:  
(RT-Calibrated) For any dispositional set D and act A that is characteristic of D: If D 
is well-calibrated, i.e. expectably good to possess in virtue of the downstream actions 
it tends to produce, then it is rational to perform A. 
This seems much more promising, though I discuss a residual concern in a note.19  
In sum: While I am uncertain that any such transmission principle is ultimately vindicated, 
formulations that focus on the subset of dispositions that are well-calibrated, in my described 
sense, would seem to have the best shot. And, as we will see, these are just the dispositions 
that may be possessed by the µsubjective¶ act consequentialist agent, in contrast to the 
unfitting but (extrinsically) desirable dispositions that we saw could be part of the 
µsophisticated¶ consequentialist psychology. We are now in a position to spell out what I take 
the fitting act consequentialist agent to look like. 
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5. The Act Consequentialist Agent 
Suppose we accept my earlier suspicion that µsophisticated¶ psychologies, with their 
extrinsically desirable dispositions, are not fitting consequentialist psychologies. The 
remaining option for defending consequentialism against fittingness objections is to spell out 
a non-defective µsubjective¶ consequentialist psychology. In attempting this task, I will 
especially make use of the idea that our account of the fitting consequentialist agent, while 
restricted to consequentialist motivations, may at least appeal to well-calibrated, if not merely 
extrinsically desirable, guiding dispositions. This restriction is one of the main features that 
sets apart my straightforward account of the fitting consequentialist psychology from the 
µsophisticated¶ view explored in §3.  
5.1 Motivating vs. Guiding Dispositions 
/HW¶V EHJLQ E\ GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ ZKDW ,¶OO FDOO µJXLGLQJ¶ DQG µPRWLYDWLQJ¶ GLVSRVLWLRQV20 Our 
non-instrumental desires or motivations are our driving concerns, or what move us to action. 
They represent the goals we hope to realize through acting. On the other hand, this 
PRWLYDWLRQDO µRRPSK¶ FDQEH VWHHUHGRUguided by strategies and heuristic dispositions that 
shape our behavioural responses in pursuit of those goals. We may think of our guiding 
dispositions as, roughly, the psychological manifestation of instrumental rationality. They 
take our desires as inputs, and output a suitable action or intention.21  
The standard caricature of the FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW DJHQW DVVXPHV WKDW ZH FDQ ³UHDG RII´ ERWK
kinds of dispositions from the moral theory. From its theory of the good²say, the utilitarian 
view that what matters is just the welfare of sentient beings²we get the fitting utilitarian 
motivations. That much I agree with: the fitting utilitarian will desire the welfare of sentient 
beings.22 %XWWKHVWDQGDUGFDULFDWXUHDOVRWDNHVWKHµPD[LPL]LQJ¶DVSHFWRIFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVP
18 
to settle the guiding dispositions of the fitting consequentialist agent: they will (allegedly) 
decide how to act by, in each instance, conducting an expected-value calculation, and then 
perform whatever action they judge to have the highest expected value. It is this feature of the 
imagined consequentialist agent that is responsible for so much of their apparent 
defectiveness (as we will see in §5.3). And it is this feature that I deny we should attribute to 
the fitting consequentialist agent.  
Can we coherently UHMHFW WKH FULWLF¶V DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW WKH ILWWLQJ FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWPXVW have 
these defective guiding dispositions? I think we can. Note, first of all, that our primary 
H[DPSOH RI D WKHRU\¶V ILWWLQJQHVV LPSOLFDWLRQV QDPHO\ WKH JRRGQHVV ± fitting desire link) 
concerns motivating dispositions. 7KHUH¶VQRVXFKFOHDUOLQNEHWZHHQ our moral theories and 
any putative implications for the fittingness of our guiding dispositions. So it seems prima 
facie open to us to dispute this assumption. 
Moreover, I think there are strong theoretical grounds for expecting the assumption to be 
false. Namely: (standard maximizing) consequentialism is naturally understood as a view that 
simply combines ordinary instrumental rationality with a specification of the moral ends to 
be pursued.23 This theoretical understanding strongly suggests that the fitting guiding 
dispositions should be determined by our independent account of instrumental rationality (as 
I will go on to explore). The distinctive positive work of consequentialism as a moral theory 
is just to add the theory of the good, with its associated implications for fitting motivating 
dispositions. The remaining distinctive content of consequentialism is negative: it simply 
denies that various other normative elements, e.g. deontological side-constraints, play any 
fundamental role in determining whaW¶VULJKWRUZKDWILWWLQJPRUDOUHDVRQLQJLVVHQVLWLYHWR 
)LQDOO\ , KRSH WR RIIHU DQ ³H[LVWHQFH SURRI´ RI WKH FRKHUHQFH RI D ILWWLQJ FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW
psychology that lacks defective guiding dispositions. ,QSDUWLFXODU ,¶OO VKRZ WKDWXWLOLWDULDQ
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motivating dispositions can be coherently combined with a plausible account of the 
instrumentally rational guiding dispositions. ,IWKHUH¶VVRPHUHDVRQWKHUHVXOWLQJDJHQWIDLOVWR
TXDOLI\DVD³ILWWLQJXWLOLWDULDQ´,WKLQNWKHRQXVLVRQWKHFULWLFWRH[SODLQwhy this is so. 
To fulfil this task, I begin with a EULHIVNHWFKRIVRPHµZHOO-FDOLEUDWHG¶JXLGLQJGLVSRVLWLRQV
which I take to be (a) prerequisites for competent human agency, and hence (b) constitutive 
of instrumental rationality, at least for agents with human-sized minds. I will then show how 
an agent with fitting utilitarian motivations could also possess these well-calibrated guiding 
dispositions. Since these guiding dispositions appear to be compatible with utilitarian (or 
other consequentialist) motivating dispositions, I conclude that there is no barrier to the 
consequentialist supplementing her theory in just this way to secure a plausible vision of the 
³ILWWLQJFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW´DJHQW I will wrap up by illustrating how my well-calibrated fitting 
consequentialist can be used to address prominent character-based objections to 
consequentialism.  
5.2 Defective Deliberation and the Well-Calibrated Agent 
Let¶V FRQVLGHU IRXU FHQWUDO IHDWXUHV RI WKH ILWWLQJ DJHQW¶V JXLGLQJ GLVSRVLWLRQV )LUVWO\²as 
perhaps the most obvious prerequisite for competent agency²we have epistemic rationality: 
that is, the agent must have well-calibrated expectations about their environment, or a basic 
understanding of what counts as evidence for what. They cannot take the roar of a dangerous 
predator as evidence that a cute puppy awaits them outside. They need to have generally 
reasonable beliefs about their environment, and about what would be effective means for 
realizing their ends (whatever those might be).  
Next, at the borderline of the epistemic and the practical, we will find constraints on how the 
agent is disposed to allocate their limited attentional resources. They must be generally 
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attentive to possible threats and opportunities in their immediate environment, while also²in 
a calm moment, when appropriate²considering more abstract mental models of past and 
possible future scenarios (for sake of planning, self-HYDOXDWLRQ HWF7KHGHWDLOV DUHQ¶W WRR
FUXFLDO IRU P\ SXUSRVHV EXW DV ZH¶OO VHH LW¶V LPSRUWDQW WKDW WKH ILWting agent not dwell 
excessively on the past.  
Third, the competent agent requires well-calibrated habits, instincts, or sub-personal 
³SUHGLVSRVLWLRQV´24²DQ³DXWR-SLORW´VHWHJWRDYRLGSDLQEHFRRSHUDWLYHDQGKHOSRWKHUVLQ
need²to secure effective automatic behaviour in normal circumstances. One reason for this 
is that in time-critical situations, the agent cannot afford to pause to reflect on their situation 
at all. Often, a competent agent will be moved immediately (without conscious deliberation) 
to act, upon registering pertinent information about their environment. This is no mere 
behavioural reflex, as the agent is genuinely acting for reasons. But the rational processing 
goes on ³below the surface´.  
Once equipped with such well-calibrated predispositions, the fitting agent may act on them 
without need for excessive self-monitoring or executive control, and²in so doing²they may 
trust that they are acting for the best. Our fitting agent may, in this way, reap the practical 
EHQHILWVRIµVDWLVILFLQJ¶ZLWKRXWWKHWKHRUHWLFDOEDJJDJH25  
7KH IRXUWK DQG ILQDO FRPSRQHQW WKDW ,¶OO GLVFXVV KHUH LV WKH SRVVHVVLRQ RI ZHOO-calibrated 
triggers for executive oversight. On pain of regress, we cannot always deliberate about 
ZKHWKHU WR VWDUWGHOLEHUDWLQJ6RDVSUHYLRXVO\QRWHG WKHDJHQW¶V default guidance must be 
from non-GHOLEHUDWLYH³SUHGLVSRVLWLRQV´%XWZKHQ WKHVHDUHQRWXS WR WKH WDVN²when, say, 
WKHDJHQWLVIDFHGZLWKQRYHORUFRPSOH[FLUFXPVWDQFHVIRUZKLFKWKHLUSUHGLVSRVLWLRQVDUHQ¶W
so well calibrated to deal with²WKH DJHQW¶V VXE-personal mechanisms must recognize this 
and respond by triggering explicit deliberation on the part of the agent.  
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In summary: the fitting human-like agent²if they are to be capable of acting competently in 
DZLGHUDQJHRIµQRUPDO¶FLUFXPVWDQFHV²will rely heavily on well-calibrated predispositions, 
rather than explicit deliberation or calculation, to guide their actions in pursuit of whatever 
their goals may be. 7KDW¶V MXVW ZKDW LW LV IRU DJHQWV ZLWK KXPDQ-sized minds to be 
instrumentally rational or have fitting guiding dispositions. And this will be so even if their 
goal is to promote the well-being of sentient creatures as much as they are able. This, I 
propose, is how we should understand the fitting consequentialist agent. They may have 
straightforwardly utilitarian (or whatever) desires, which are then translated into action via 
the above-GHVFULEHGµZHOO-calLEUDWHG¶JXLGLQJGLVSRVLWLRQV 
5.3 Addressing the objections 
We are now in a position to assess how my conception of the fitting consequentialist agent 
stands up to various anti-consequentialist objections.  
:H FDQ ILUVW QRWH WKDW P\ µZHOO-FDOLEUDWHG¶ ILWWLQJ FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW ZLOO QRW EH ³FRQVWDQWO\
FDOFXODWLQJ´ $EVHQW DQ\ WULJJHULQJ RI WKHLU H[HFXWLYH IDFXOW\ WKH ILWWLQJ XWLOLWDULDQ IRU
example) will respond directly to the salient needs of others²a child drowning in a pond, 
say²without mediation by explicit deliberation, let alone abstract judgments of 
³SHUPLVVLELOLW\´ ,Q WKLV ZD\ WKH ILWWLQJ FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW ZLOO QRW H[KLELW ZKDW Williams 
IDPRXVO\FDOOHG³RQHWKRXJKWWRRPDQ\´26  
The fitting consequentiDOLVW¶V UHOLDQFHRQJHQHUDOO\-reliable predispositions also undermines 
WKH REMHFWLRQ WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG HQJDJH LQ ³PDUJLQDOO\-beneficial rule-EUHDNLQJ´ VXFK DV
breaking a promise whenever the benefits from doing so seem to even slightly outweigh the 
costs.27 
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Because overt calculation often goes awry, the competent consequentialist will²DV ZH¶YH
seen²rely heavily on her generally reliable predispositions in everyday life, only pausing to 
reflect when her well-calibrated sub-personal mechanisms alert her to the need (say due to 
FRPSOH[QRYHOFLUFXPVWDQFHV WKDWKHU³DXWR-SLORW´ZDVQ¶WGHVLJQHG WRGHDOZLWK(YHU\GD\
promise-keeping is not exactly novel, so for the fitting agent the question whether to keep a 
promise VKRXOGQ¶WHYHQDULVHXQOHVV WKHUH¶VVRPHWKLQJspecial about the situation that calls 
for her executive oversight.  
7KDW¶VHQRXJKWRGHIHDWWKHFODLPWKDWWKHILWWLQJFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWZRXOGFRPPRQO\HQJDJHLQ
marginally-beneficial rule-breaking. But we may draw an even stronger conclusion. For 
suppose WKDWRXUDJHQW¶VH[HFXWLYHRYHUVLJKWKDSSHQVWREHWULJJHUHG,QDW\SLFDOFDVHZKDW
should she conclude? We can stipulate that in fact the outcome would be marginally better if 
she broke her promise, but presumably the agent herself will not have any easy way of 
NQRZLQJWKLV$PRQJRWKHUWKLQJVVKH¶GQHHGWRILUVWFRQVLGHUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIVHOI-serving 
bias corrupting her judgment, and also to weigh the apparent benefits of rule-breaking in this 
instance against the long-run value of retaining a reputation for trustworthiness.) Maybe if 
she heard the booming voice of God reassuring her of this fact, then she could rationally go 
ahead and break her promise without further worry. Such behaviour no longer seems 
intuitively troubling to me. But in ordinary circumstances, when rule-breaking might seem 
more worrying, LW¶VDOPRVWQHYHUJRLQJWREHclear that rule-breaking is beneficial unless it is 
significantly (not merely marginally) so.28  
So our agent is faced with an immediate choice: she can (i) break the UXOHHYHQWKRXJKLW¶VQRW
yet clear to her whether this would have good results on net; (ii) sink further cognitive 
UHVRXUFHVLQWRLQYHVWLJDWLQJDTXHVWLRQWKDWVKHSUREDEO\VKRXOGQ¶WKDYHERWKHUHGWRDVNLQWKH
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first place; or (iii) simply keep her promise and turn her attention to more important matters. 
It seems pretty clear that, in this sort of case, option (iii) is the way to go.29  
In sum: Breaking a rule will generally only be obviously worthwhile in cases where it is also 
of significant benefit (in which case many would approve of rule-EUHDNLQJDQ\ZD\ ,I LW¶V
RQO\RIPDUJLQDOEHQHILWWKLVIDFWW\SLFDOO\ZRQ¶WEHVXIILFLHQWO\FOHDUIRUDUHDVRQDEO\VHOI-
doubting, fallible agent to immediately act upon. And the low potential payoff means that it 
isQ¶W UHDOO\ ZRUWK LQTXLULQJ IXUWKHU EHWWHU MXVW WR VWLFN ZLWK WKH JHQHUDOO\-reliable rule of 
thumb. So a fitting FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW JHQHUDOO\ ZRQ¶W EH IRXQG HQJDJLQJ LQ PDUJLQDOO\
beneficial rule-EUHDNLQJ DIWHU DOO 7KH\¶G HYHQ VKDUH RXU LQWXLWLRQ WKDW WKHUH¶V VRPHWKLQJ
awfully dubious about any agent who would act that way.) This gives them the kind of stable 
predictability needed for others to regard them as eligible and (more or less) trustworthy 
partners for social cooperation.  
This discussion brings out the fact that the standard caricature of a consequentialist agent 
assumes that they will be unreasonably overconfident in their ability to calculate expected 
values accurately. But even if a consequentialist initially judges (just based on the first order 
evidence) that they would do best to break some generally beneficial rule, they may also 
realize that most people who make such judgments in similar situations are mistaken. Since 
they have no particular reason to think that they are one of the lucky few who make this 
judgment correctly, the general fact serves as a kind of higher-order evidence that their initial 
judgment was mistaken. All things considered, then, a reasonable expected value judgment 
should, in this sort of circumstance, end up reinforcing the general rule rather than licensing 
typically-misguided unilateral rule-breaking.30  
The objections considered thus far²WKDW WKHFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWZRXOGKDYH³RQH WKRXJKW WRR
PDQ\´ DQG WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG HQJDJH LQ ³PDUJLQDOO\-beneficial rule-EUHDNLQJ´²suggest the 
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need to distinguish (i) the appropriate answer to a question, and (ii) whether a well-
functioning agent would ask that question in the first place. The need for this distinction 
becomes especially apparent when we consider the following objection from Michael 
Stocker:  
Maximizers hold that the absence of any attainable good is, as such, bad, and that a life that lacks such 
a good is therefore lacking. I disagree. One central reason for my disagreement stems from the moral 
psychological import of regretting the absence or lack of any and every attainable good. This regret is a 
central characterizing feature of narcissistic, grandiose, and other defective selves. It is also 
characteristic of those who are too hard on themselves, who are too driven and too perfectionistic.31 
This objection strikes me as deeply misguided. It may be unfortunate, and indeed even 
LQDSSURSULDWH ³GHIHFWLYH´ WRDFWLYHO\ UHJUHWHYHU\ OLWWOH UHJUHWWDEOH WKLQJ%XW WKRVH WKLQJV
may be regrettable all the same. Crucially, this is not to say that a rational agent must regret 
them. It is more like a hypothetical imperative: if you closely attend to the features in 
question, this should induce feelings of regret. But it may be a kind of rational defect to 
attend to the wrong things, if there are more pressing matters to attend to. As we saw in §5.2, 
the fitting agent would allocate their attentional resources in a way that avoids excessive 
dwelling on hypotheticals. So we can agree with Stocker that the agents he describes are 
defective, without thinking that the maximizing consequentialist would exhibit any such trait. 
On my picture, the consequentialist will have only a conditional disposition to regret the lack 
of a good insofar as she attends to this lack%XWVKH¶OOXVXDOO\KDYHPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKLQJVWR
DWWHQGWRVRVKHVKRXOGQ¶WDFWXDOO\HQGXp actively regretting things very often at all. She is, 
in this sense, appropriately responsive to reasons for regret, without having to be constantly 
responding to them.  
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,¶YH QRZ VKRZQ KRZ WKH ZHOO-calibrated fitting consequentialist avoids three of the 
µFKDUDFWHU-EDVHG REMHFWLRQV¶ H[WDQW LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH (TXLSSLQJ WKH FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW DJHQW
with well-calibrated guiding dispositions helps to undermine claims that the fitting 
consequentialist psychology is inherently defective.  
5.4 Act vs. Rule Consequentialist Agents 
In light of my appeal to rules and dispositions, some readers may be puzzled by my labelling 
WKHUHVXOWLQJDJHQWDILWWLQJµDFWFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVW¶DJHQW7RDYRLGDQ\FRQIXVLRQRQWKLVIURQW
let me wrap up by briefly characterizing what I take to be the two main differences between 
(fitting) act and rule consequentialist psychologies.  
First, while both make use of rules, they do so in very different ways. The act 
FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWDGRSWVµUXOHVRIWKXPE¶IRUinstrumental purposes, but their fundamental aim 
(reflected in my account of the fitting motivating dispositions) makes no essential reference 
to rules: they just want to bring about the best possible outcome, and refraining from 
deliberation is one (guiding) strategy they might employ, at appropriate times, as a means to 
this end. Rule Consequentialism, by contrast, builds reference to rules into its criterion of 
ULJKW DFWLRQ DQG KHQFH WKH FRUUHVSRQGLQJ µILWWLQJ SV\FKRORJ\¶ PXVW OLNHZLVH DFFRUG VRPH
fundamental, non-instrumental significance to rules²HJLQWKHDJHQW¶VIXQGDPHQWDOGHVLUHV
or motivating dispositions. (This then opens them up to distinctively characterological 
REMHFWLRQVRIµUXOH-ZRUVKLS¶ 
A second, more straightforward difference is that they may employ rules with very different 
FRQWHQWV,¶YHVXJJHVWHGWKDWDILWWLQJDFWFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWFRXOGZKLOVWUHWDLQLQJWKHLUILWWLQJ
FKDUDFWHURQO\PDNHXVHRI µZHOO-FDOLEUDWHG¶ dispositions²dispositions whose value stems 
from the improved quality of the actions they dispose the agent towards. But insofar as rule 
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consequentialism appeals to rules that it would be good to internalize for whatever reason, 
WKH\ PD\ ZHOO HQG XS FDOOLQJ µILWWLQJ¶ HYHQ GLVSRVLWLRQV WKDW DUH PHUHO\ H[WULQVLFDOO\
desirable. In other words, the fitting rule consequentialist agent would look much more like 
WKHNLQGRIµVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶DJHQWGHVFULEHGLQ§3. 
For example, suppose that suffering is always bad, but that widespread adoption of retributive 
attitudes towards punishment would form part of the optimal PRUDO µFRGH¶ LQ D FHUWDLQ
society. Since rule consequentialism assigns direct, non-instrumental significance to the rules 
of the optimal code, the fitting rule-consequentialist agent would presumably have to have 
corresponding non-instrumental desires. That is, rule consequentialism, in the imagined 
circumstances, has the implication that retributive punishment is fitting to desire. %XWZH¶YH
VXSSRVHG WKDW LQ IDFW LW LVQ¶W GHVLUDEOH VXIIHULQJ LV always bad.  (The fitting act 
consequentialist, by contrast, may only desire to promote the good.  If better results would be 
obtained with different attitudes, then this may lead them to try to transform their character so 
that they no longer qualify as a fitting act consequentialist at all.  But while their view might 
thus recommend retributive or other attitudes, it maintains the distinction between the 
practically recommended attitudes and the ones that are fitting to their objects as a matter of 
principle.) 
This then provides the basis for a simple new argument against rule consequentialism. Rule 
consequentialism implies that literally anything (from retributive punishment to gratuitous 
torture) could be rendered fitting to desire, just by tweaking the incentives surrounding the 
FUHDWLRQ DQG PDLQWHQDQFH RI WKH SXEOLF¶V PRUDO FRGH But these things are not, in such 
circumstances, fitting to desire. 6XFKGHVLUHVDUHVXSSRUWHGE\WKH³ZURQJNLQGRIUHDVRQV´²
it is not the objects of these desires that are desirable, but rather the state of possessing the 
desire itself (or something to do with promulgating the moral rule, depending on what exactly 
27 
is responsible for generating the good consequences). Rule consequentialism thus has false 
LPSOLFDWLRQVDERXWZKDW¶VILWWLQJDQGLVWKHUHE\VKRZQWREHIDOVHLWVHOI32 
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